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〔Research Paper〕 
Four Case Studies of High-Tech Startups  
In Cambridge 
Noriko Taji* and Emiko Tsuyuki** 
Abstract 
We suggest that the global strategy of high- 
tech startups can be categorized into two types. 
One pursues technological originality; the other 
offers greater customer convenience. We present 
two propositions, which are related to resource 
acquisition and target market, for each type and 
examine four case-studies of firms located in 
Cambridge, U.K.  
Startups of the type that pursue technological 
originality target the global market and strive to 
become a de facto standard from the start. They 
are highly globalized in acquiring core technology, 
financial and human resource. 
Startups of the type that offer greater customer 
convenience start from a limited local market and 
acquire core technology, financial and human 
resources from local sources. If they develop their 
competitive advantage, they can expand their 
business to the global market. 
1. Research Objectives 
Entrepreneurship has been defined as a 
mechanism by which entrepreneurs discover and 
exploit opportunities to recombine existing resources 
to enhance wealth (Kirzner, 1973; Schumpeter, 
1934). Entrepreneurial success depends on an 
entrepreneur’s finding and utilizing an opportunity 
well (Shane and Venkataraman, 2000). Having to 
overcome numerous difficulties to achieve this goal 
is predictable. Today, however, the hurdles are 
higher than ever. With globalization affecting whole 
industries, small as well as large firms must 
compete in the global marketplace over the country 
boundary. This paper examines how high-tech 
startup 1) globalization strategies affect procurement 
of key resources (core technology, financing, 
management team, alliance and client networks).  
High-tech startups, seen as the seeds of new 
industries, are launched as global companies and 
must thus, from the very beginning, consider how 
best to enter the global market and how best to 
position development manufacturing and sales from 
a global perspective. They do not have the luxury 
of developing domestic markets before they go 
global. From the very beginning they are engaged 
in what McDougall and Oviatt (2000) call inter- 
national entrepreneurship “ a combination of 
innovative, proactive and risk-seeking behavior 
that crosses national borders and is intended to 
create value in organizations - ”  International 
entrepreneurs seek business opportunities in the 
global marketplace based on their understanding of 
current market and technology trends. They 
pursue innovation in the global market to 
differentiate themselves from existing companies. 
Their global activities create intersections where 
differences in customary business practice, tech- 
nological climate and culture meet, knowledge is 
exchanged and recombined to stimulate innovation 
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and new business creation.  
This is, however, only an ideal image of 
international entrepreneurship. Startups find it 
difficult to acquire the financial and human 
resources that global activities require. Silicon 
Valley has been an exception, in that these 
resources are concentrated and accessible there. 
But what happens in other regions and countries? 
How do startups not based in Silicon Valley acquire 
the resources global growth requires?  
This paper partially answers this question. It 
proposes a theoretical model in which resource 
acquisition is dependent on global strategy and 
tests it be examining a small set of startups located 
in the region around Cambridge in the UK. Since all 
of the firms share the possibility of utilizing existing 
resources, output from university laboratories, 
alumni networks, angels and VCs, all clustered 
around Cambridge University, we are able to 
control these factors and focus on the relation 
between global strategy and resource acquisition.  
2. Proposition — Types of Global Strategy 
2.1. Industry and market 
First, we consider what industries and markets 
are easiest for startups to enter as a basis for 
classifying global strategies.  
Many startups enter the market just after new 
industries emerge. New challengers are eager to 
participate in the market because there are few 
existing companies that meet customer needs 
(Geroski, 1995). Then, however, as time goes by, it 
becomes more difficult for new entrants. Malbera 
and Orsenigo (2000) explain: If an existing firm 
having gradually climbed the learning curve 
develops its product / service effectively, new firms 
cannot catch up with it. Thus, as an industry 
becomes more mature, a startup is at a growing 
disadvantage. While an industry is still infant, 
however, its immaturity stimulates entrepreneur- 
ship. Data has been presented showing that the 
rate of failure of startups rises in proportion to the 
maturity of the industry (Barnett, 1997; Wade el al, 
1998). This research does not, however, concern 
high-tech industries.  
Several studies that have discussed the relation 
between entrepreneurship and maturity of high- 
tech industry have pointed to dominant design as a 
critical factor in industry maturity. Utterback 
(1994), Tushman and Anderson (1986), and 
Murmann and Tushman (2001) have shown that the 
number of new entrants increases until a dominant 
design solidifies its position.  
In markets where a dominant design is 
established, it is difficult for startups to find 
business opportunities anywhere except in extreme 
niches. Here I suggest that high-tech startup 
strategies begin with the assumption that the 
present market is immature, and that it will grow 
and be global.  
2.2 Types of Startup Strategies 
We suggest that high-tech startup global 
strategies can be categorized into two types. One 
pursues technological originality; the other offers 
greater customer convenience. Offering greater 
customer convenience requires simplification of 
product or payment. In contrast, technological 
originality may include radical innovation which 
render existing technology obsolete. Technological 
originality allows startups to develop products or 
services which other companies find difficult to 
imitate. Figure 1 shows a matrix in which these 
strategic options are rated high or low.  
The strategy which includes both high customer 
convenience and high technological originality (H-H) 
is ideal but difficult to implement. It places a heavy 
burden on startups, especially those that lack 
managerial resources. Low customer conve- nience 
and low technological originality (L-L) is ruled out 
because it adds no value. Only two strategies, then, 
are realistic approaches for startups to pursue: high 
customer convenience and low technological 
originality (H-L) or low customer convenience and 
high technological originality (L-H).  
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Figure 1: Types of Startup strategy  
  Customer Convenience
  High Low 
High Difficult Possible Technological 
Originality 
Low Possible Unattractive
 
2.2.1 Pursuit of technological originality 
Startups with L-H strategies display the 
following characteristics. 
 
1. Established expertise in a particular field.  
2. Commercialization of technology seeds owned 
by universities and large companies. 
3. Efficient R&D through licensing or collaborative 
research with existing companies 
 
These are typically academic startups, which use 
intellectual property from universities and national 
labs or spin-offs which exploit technology whose 
development has been interrupted at the companies 
that own the seeds. As these startups require huge 
amounts of time and money to be able to supply 
concrete products or services, they must try to obtain 
funding through licensing or compensate for the lack 
of resources through collaborative research. By 
creating new intellectual property, they make 
themselves hard to imitate. We expect this kind of 
startup to emerge in such cutting-edge technology 
fields as clean-tech, life science and semiconductors.  
Shane (2004) has suggested that there are 
seven characteristics of technology seeds that 
make them fundamental resources for academic 
startups. They are radical, tacit, early stage, 
versatile, high in customer value, dramatic 
advances in technology, and firmly protected by 
intellectual property rights. While technology 
seeds with these characteristics may spur the 
growth of large new markets in the future, the 
immature markets in which they appear allow 
immediate growth and offer room for new entrants. 
These considerations suggest two propositions 
about high-tech startups that pursue technological 
innovation.  
 
Proposition 1: Startups that pursue technological 
originality target global markets and aim from 
the start to become a de facto standard. 
 
Proposition 2: They are highly globalized in 
acquiring core technology, financial and human 
resources. 
2.2.2 Offering greater customer convenience 
Startups that pursue a greater customer 
convenience strategy display the following 
characteristics. 
 
1. targeting niche products or market segments 
untapped by existing companies 
2. agile and flexible response to customer needs 
3. simplifying procedures; technology offer or 
payment  
4. fast and secure commercialization through 
collaboration with lead-users   
 
While total market size for the product or 
service may be substantial, the target market is 
comparatively small. Because it does not attract 
large companies, there is room for startups 
targeting niche among existing technology. These 
startups emphasize service tailored to customer 
needs or localization of product design instead of 
low price or high performance. Their product 
delivery and payment systems save their customers 
trouble and contribute to high convenience. For 
startups adopting these strategies, priority number 
one is to identify customer needs. Thus we see a 
pattern of commercialization that involves collabo- 
ration with lead users at the design stage. Building 
business models which offer high convenience even 
without advanced technology can become these 
startups’ competitive edge. Initial offerings are 
commonly commercialized locally, with globalization 
following at a later stage.  
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We offer the following propositions about the 
globalization strategies of high-take startups that 
pursue customer convenience.  
 
Proposition 3: Startups offering customer convenience 
target initially target local markets, develop 
their competitive advantage, and then expand 
into global markets. 
Proposition 4: These startups are not highly 
globalized in acquisition of core technology, 
financial and human resources. 
 
While our propositions emphasize differences 
between startups that pursue technological originality 
and startups that pursue customer convenience, we 
should also note similarities. Both pursue alliances, 
both to supplement available resources and to 
speed development through collaborative R&D with 
existing companies or lead-users. 
3. Four Cambridge Startups 
The subjects of this study of entrepreneurship 
in the Cambridge region of the UK where many 
independent, high-teach startups are clustered are 
four firms in the life science, semiconductor, or ICT 
fields.2) 
Figure 2 shows the overview of startups pursing 
technological originality and Figure 3 shows the 
overview of startups offering customer convenience. 
 
Figure 2. Overview of Two Cases (Pursuit of technological originality) 
 Semiconductor Life Science 
Name CDT Astex 
Spin-off Type Academic Startup Academic Startup 
Technology Seeds Professor & Researcher of Cambridge Univ. (Founders) Professor of Cambridge Univ. (Founders) 
Product & Service Developing material and devices of PLEDs Offering a drug discovering tool & Developing a new drug 
Founded 1989 1999 
Raised capital 
before exit $360M (Estimated) £70M (Estimated) 
Initial investor Cambridge Univ. Local VC 
Abingworth Management (UK), 
Oxford Biosciences Partners (US), 
Cambridge Univ. 
Main investor Lord Young of Grafham (UK) Intel (US) etc. Other ten private VCs in US & UK 
Exist Listed in Nasdaq in 2004 Sold to Sumitomo Chemical in 2007 Sold to an American company in 2011 
Alliance partner Sumitomo Chemical (Japan), Philips, Seiko Epson (Japan) 
AstraZeneca 、 Pfizer 、 GlaxoSmithKline 、
Janssen Research Foundation 、 Fujisawa 
Pharma, Mitsubishi Pharma (Japan) 
How to alliance Licensing, R&D Collaboration Offering an analyzing tool, R&D collaboration, Delegated research 
Connection Alliance partner Alliance partner 
Founders Professor & postdoctoral fellow of Cambridge Univ. 
Two professor of Cambridge  
Former CEO of big pharm, 
Venture capitalist 
Academic degree 
and position Science adviser (PhD)、CTO (PhD) CEO (PhD)、Science adviser (PhD) 
Management team 
CEO: Former CEO of an American chemical 
company 
Professionals of Phillips and Dow Corning, 
Former CFO of startups going public 
PhD, Professionals of big pharm 
Former CFO of Startups going public 
Channel of 
management Related industry and VC Academy, VC, Network of founders  
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3.1 Cambridge Display Technology 
(Semiconductors) 
Cambridge Display Technology (CDT) develops 
materials and produces devices using polymer 
organic light-emitting diodes (P-OLEDs). This 
core technology has raised high expectations since 
the 1990s as a possible replacement for liquid- 
crystal display. The year 2011 saw electronics 
manufacturers begin test production of large screen 
displays using this technology. CDT was founded in 
1992 using the research results of Cambridge 
University professor Richard Friend and researcher 
Jeremy Burroughes. In 2004 it was listed on 
NASDAQ, and in 2007 was bought out by 
Sumitomo Chemical. In 2006, the last year for 
which sales figures were disclosed, total sales had 
reached US$8 million, and the company’s 
employees numbered 120.   
(1) Capital Procurement 
CDT was launched with university funding, then 
looked for ways to develop the business and fund 
production through connections with local angels. 
Since it came to required large sums for those 
purposes, however, the company’s strategy changed 
to supplying technology to other firms. In 1996, a 
CEO was recruited from Siemens and in 1997, on 
the strength of success in supplying technology to 
Philips, it was able to raise US$9.7 million from one 
of the UK’s largest venture capital firms, Lord 
Young of Grafham, and to secure additional funding 
from Intel’s investment arm. That was followed by a 
joint venture with Seiko-Epson to develop ink jet 
technology for printing polymer-OLED’s on fabrics. 
Then, in 1999, an additional capital infusion of $133 
million was received from US investment funds 
Kelso Investment and Hilman Capital. These funds 
were used to build the firm’s R&D center and to 
buy out other startups. In 2004, CDT was listed on 
Nasdaq, and in 2005 an energy-saving technology 
project was begun with Sumitomo Chemical. That 
project led to Sumitomo Chemical’s acquisition of 
CDT in 2007 (for an estimated $360 million).  
(2) Alliances 
Besides the firms mentioned above, CDT’s 
business partners also include Matsushita Electric, 
Dai Nippon Printing, and Delta Optoelectronics, to 
all of which CDT supplies technology. CDT 
technology is used in products ranging from mobile 
phones and miniature cameras to MP3 players.  
(3) Management Team and HR 
The inventor-professor has become an advisor 
on technology. The other inventor, after working 
for Toshiba for six years, became Chief Technology 
Officer (CTO) in 1997. In 1999, anticipating the 
need for large-scale investment, David Fyfe took 
over as CEO. A Cambridge University Ph.D. in 
electronics, he had previously been CEO of a large 
American chemical company. Two vice-presidents 
are specialists in OLED technology with experience 
at large electronics or chemical firms. The CFO 
had experience supporting other listings on the 
London and Nasdaq stock exchanges. The manage- 
ment team is, thus, composed of top professionals 
in their fields from both inside and outside the UK.  
3.2 Astex Therapeutics (Life Science) 
Astex Therapeutics has combined X-ray 
crystallography and magnetic resonance imaging to 
develop a drug development support technology for 
drug design using fragment-based analysis of 
molecular structures, a technology that makes 
possible more efficient isolation of promising new 
pharmaceuticals. It both supplies this technology 
to other pharmaceutical firms and develops its own 
new drugs, constantly aiming to maintain a full 
pipeline. Founded in 1999, Astex had, in its first 
decade, produced numerous new drug candidates 
that reached stage 1 clinical testing.  
Astex is an academic startup whose founders 
include Sir Tom Blundell, head of the biochemistry 
department at Cambridge University, Chris Abell, 
a professor in the same department, Harren Jhoti, 
who was both a former chair of Glaxo Wellcome and 
chair of the UK Structural Biology Association, and 
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Robert Solari from Abingworth, the first VC to 
invest in the firm. Sales figures are unavailable, but 
as of 2010, the firm had 75 employees. In 2011, 
Astex was bought out by U.S.-based Supergen and 
renamed Astex Pharmaceuticals.  
(1) Capital Procurement 
One of Astex’s founding partners was Abingworth 
Management, a private sector VC with an office in 
Cambridge. (Its headquarters are in London.) Seed 
money was procured from Abingworth Management 
and Boston-based Oxford Biosciences Partners. 
Two years later, Astex raised 28 million British 
pounds from five entities in a private placement. 
Estimates suggest that Astex had procured a total 
of 70 million British pounds as of 2007  
Astex’s aggressive approach to capital 
procurement reflected not only a desire to develop 
and sell systems that would shorten the lead time 
for new drug development, but also its intention to 
discover and develop drugs itself, a goal for which 
large amounts of capital were needed. It was also 
necessary to raise funds to buy out a German 
bioventure, to expand its pipeline. Apart from 
Cambridge University, where two of the founders 
were employed, all funds were raised from VCs 
specializing in life science and investing globally.  
(2) Alliances 
The year after Astex was founded, it reached an 
agreement with Janssen Biotech, followed the year 
after that by an agreement with AstraZeneca. In 
addition to technology licensing agreements with 
some 20 pharmaceuticals companies and research 
foundations, Astex also participates in joint and 
commissioned research projects. Partners in these 
projects include most of the world’s largest 
pharmaceuticals companies, including many based 
in Japan.  
(3) Management Team and HR 
Examining Astex’s efforts to strengthen its 
management team during the decade after its 
founding, we identify three distinct periods: from 
founding to 2003, when the company was focused 
on developing and testing its basic technology, a 
middle period when it actively developed alliances 
on the basis of that technology, and a third period 
during which it was focused on preparation for an 
IPO. During the first, technology-oriented period, 
it recruited experts in computational chemistry, 
proteins, high-throughput screening, and NMR to 
join its executive team. The focus during this 
period was on talent that could help create new 
drug development technologies and accelerate 
their use in drug discovery. During the middle 
period, the focus shifted to lawyers and individuals 
experienced with clinical trials, to support internal 
drug development efforts. Then, in 2006, it added a 
CFO with IPO experience in anticipation of the 
IPO. The successful timing of these efforts can be 
attributed to the founders’ stature as leaders in 
their fields in the UK, their networks of 
connections through academic associations and 
with pharmaceutical industry firms, and the global 
reach of their VCs, which facilitated recruitment, in 
particular in the USA.  
3.3 Abcam (Life Science) 
Abcam was founded in 1998 by three men who 
shared a common vision, to use the Web to market 
antibodies worldwide. The first was Jonathan Milner, 
a postdoctoral fellow at Cambridge University, the 
second his academic mentor, and the third an angel 
investor, David Cleevely, famous for his contribu- 
tions to growing a telecommunications business. 
Abcam was founded in the same year as Google. As 
the Internet became more pervasive, Abcam grew 
by expanding its Web-based catalogue. As of 2010, 
annual sales had reached 72 million British pounds, 
operating profit was 35%, and the company’s 
employees numbered 250 worldwide.  
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Figure 3. Overview of Two Cases (Offering customer convenience) 
 Life Science ICT 
Name Abcam Bango 
Spin-off Type Academic Startup Third startup 
Technology Seeds Postdoctoral fellow of Cambridge (founder & CEO) Developing after founding 
Product & Service Development and procurement antibody Charge and payment system of mobile 
Founded 1998 1999 
Raised capital 
before exit £250K Unknown 
Initial investor Famous angel (founder), Local angels Local VC, Local investment bank 
Main investor Angels ET Capital, Wood Side Capital (UK) 
Exist Listed in AIM in 2005 (£15.5M raised) 
Listed in AIM in 2005 
(£6.2M raised) 
Alliance partner Universities ＿ 
How to alliance Procurement by academic labs ＿ 
Connection University labs, National labs, Biotech company 
Broad casting and mobile communication 
companies (Discovery Channel, Yahoo, MTV, 
NTT Docomo etc.) 
Founders Professor & postdoctoral fellow of Cambridge Univ., Famous angel Alumni of Cambridge 
Academic degree 
and position 
CEO (PhD), Chairman (PhD)、 
Non executive director (PhD) CEO (Bachelor) 
Management team VP (PhD of Cambridge or alumni) 
CFO & Chairman ( professionals of startups), 
VP invited from US, Part-time director 
assigned by VC 
Channel of 
management team Network of founders 
Former co-workers, Network of related 
industry 
 
(1) Capital Procurement 
Seed money and Series A funding were provided 
by angels, including one of the founders, who was 
already well known in Cambridge for investing in 
startup businesses. The initial seed money was only 
250 thousand British pounds. A business that 
required only the procurement of antibodies and 
the announcement on the Web that they were 
available for sale did not require a heavy 
investment. Like Google, which was founded in the 
same year, Abcam grew along with the Internet. It 
was unable to procure additional capital from VCs, 
but, instead, accumulated profits from successful 
sales in North America. Its 2005 IPO raised 15.5 
million British pounds, which were used to develop 
new business in Japan and Hong Kong.  
(2) Alliances 
Basic research on antibodies is conducted in 
university and government laboratories. Applied 
research is typically joint research involving 
universities and biotech companies, and the resulting 
antibodies are used in pharmaceutical company 
laboratories. Abcam sales are 48% to universities, 
24% to biotech companies and government laboratories, 
and 23% to pharmaceutical companies. Its suppliers 
include many university and government 
laboratories; in all, Abcam does business with 250 
companies. Only 4% of the antibodies it sells are 
produced near Abcam’s headquarters. Its initial 
customers were in the UK, but it has gradually 
expanded to reach a global customer base. 
Five years after the company’s founding, it set 
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up an office in Cambridge, Massachusetts, in the 
USA, followed by offices in Japan and Hong Kong. 
Its online catalogue lists more than 60,000 items. 
Because the amounts supplied are small, only a few 
CC, global purchasing, storage, and shipping costs 
are low. Speedy delivery and technical support that 
ensures that the antibodies supplied are optimized 
for the customer’s research are the strengths of the 
Abcam business model. Sales are now 44% to North 
America, 30% to Europe, 9% to Japan, 8% to the UK, 
and 5% to China.  
(3) Management Team and HR 
Besides the founders, the managers in charge of 
business development, logistics, and Web system 
design all have doctorates in biochemistry or 
pathology from Cambridge. They do not feel 
uncomfortable in being responsible for areas 
outside their R&D specialties. They joined the firm 
in their twenties, were in their thirties at the time 
of the IPO, and have reached the rank of general 
manager or vice president. Most other employees, 
especially those involved in R&D, are graduates of 
Cambridge University.  
3.4 Bango (ICT) 
Bango provides billing, payment and analytics 
solutions for the mobile Internet. Founder Ray 
Anderson is a serial entrepreneur. After graduating 
with a degree in computer science from Cambridge 
University, he founded and managed several 
startups, which he then sold to other companies. 
He founded Bango in 1999. Co-founder Anil 
Malhotra had been in charge of tie-ups and 
licensing for Anderson’s second startup. As of 2010 
Bango’s annual sales were approximately 26 million 
British pounds, with operating profit at 10% and 50 
employees.  
(1) Capital Procurement 
The bulk of the seed money for Bango’s founding 
was capital gains from the sale of the two founders’ 
previous startups. Following the company’s IPO, 
the three managing directors continue to own more 
than 30% of its shares. Subsequent efforts to raise 
funds did not go as well as expected, and the 
founders have ended up continuing to own a high 
proportion of the shares. Partners in two local VCs, 
ET Capital and Electric and General Investment 
Trust, serve as non-executive directors of Bango 
and have also invested personally in the firm. 
Herald Ventures and Chase Nominee, two local 
VCs, are the only corporations that hold more than 
5% of the the firm’s shares. The 6.2 million British 
pounds raised by the 2005 IPO were used to set up 
the firm’s data center.  
(2) Alliances 
Bango has two types of customers, content 
providers and mobile telecoms. To solidify its 
position in the European market, the firm opened 
offices in Germany and Spain. Then, entering the 
larger US market, it developed services for 
U.S.-based broadcasters (Discovery Channel, 
Yahoo, MTV). The firm now has a bipolar structure, 
with European operations concentrated in London 
and US operations concentrated on the US east 
coast.  
(3) Management Team and HR 
Founders Ray Anderson and Anil Malhotra have 
continued to be in charge after the IPO. Five years 
after the founding, they added an experienced CFO 
whose background included serving as managing 
director in charge of finance for a large corporation 
in the same industry. The company’s ability to 
attract two highly experienced vice-presidents 
from Silicon Valley to manage sales and admini- 
stration was rooted in the fact that the CEO had 
lived in the US following the sale of a previous 
startup to an American corporation. The network 
he built during that time made it possible to 
construct an international management team and 
develop business in the US. All of the firm’s 
management team had global experience and 
substantial achievements in telecommunications, 
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electronic trading, or software, and were able to 
contribute to the expansion of Bango’s business.  
4. Conclusions — Examining the 
Propositions 
Of the four firms described in Part 3, Astex and 
CDT are in the technology originality category; 
Abcam and Bango focus, instead, on greater 
customer convenience. Since Astex and Abcam are 
both life science-related businesses, they provide a 
good contrast. Let us review briefly the evidence 
for these classifications.  
Astex’s drug-screening tools support drug 
design using fragment-based drug discovery. By 
making it possible to analyze interactions between 
fragments of larger molecules, its technology makes 
it possible to analyze the structures of proteins 
more accurately, in a clear departure from existing 
tools. The seeds of CDT’s technology have been 
featured in the prestigious scientific journal Nature,  
and it has been a major player in OLED 
development. Both companies’ technologies are 
based on cutting-edge science and are extremely 
distinctive. In contrast, Abcam is involved in 
developing and marketing antibodies, a business 
with a much lower threshold. It has secured its 
present position by being the first mover in putting 
its catalogue on the Web. Bango’s mobile Internet 
billing and payment services compete in a market 
where the spread of mobile devices has led to 
ferocious competition. Its edge is maintained by 
carefully tailored customization. These two companies 
have succeeded by offering superior customer 
convenience.  
Staring from this classification, let us turn now 
to propositions 1-4.  
 
Proposition 1: Startups that pursue technological 
originality target global markets and aim from 
the start to become a de facto standard. 
 
Both Astex and CDT build on core technologies 
based on discoveries by Cambridge University 
faculty members. Aiming to commercialize these 
discoveries, they are classic examples of academic 
startups. From the beginning, both looked for joint 
research partners and customers worldwide.  
If we look at the nationalities of the firms with 
which Astex has tie-ups, we find that its first 
joint-research tie-up was with Janssen Biotech, a 
firm based in Belgium. Next came UK-based 
AstraZeneca, followed by Mitsubishi Well Pharma 
(Mitsubishi Tanabe Pharma since 2007) in Japan. 
CDT first licensed its technology to Philips and 
Uniax, companies based in the Netherlands and the 
United States. Both Astex and CDT have aimed to 
establish their own technologies as the global 
default standards as quickly as possible. That both 
used the exit strategy of a buyout by major 
corporations outside their home country was a 
demonstration of the value put on their highly 
sophisticated advances, which have, in fact, been 
accepted as global standards.  
 
Proposition 2: They are highly globalized in 
acquiring core technology, financial and human 
resources. 
 
While still at the growth stage, both firms 
formed numerous alliances. While participating in 
joint research and undertaking commissioned 
research, they supplied development tools and 
know-how. In the process, they were able to 
integrate a variety of component technologies and 
strengthen their core technologies. Astex is on 
public record as a participant in 26 joint research 
projects and technology licensing agreements. Its 
partners include pharmaceuticals companies and 
laboratories scattered across Europe, the US and 
Japan. CDT is on public record as having entered 
into tie-ups with nearly 10 electronics and printing 
equipment manufacturers, most of which are 
Japanese companies. It also bought out a local 
startup that specialized in development of component 
technology for OLEDs.  
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Turning to capital procurement, we see that 
from the seed money stage through subsequent 
rounds of financing, Astex procured funds from 
multiple VCs, including some American sources. 
CDT’s seed money came only from local VCs, but 
following its success with licensing, it succeeded in 
procuring additional capital from Intel and a 
US-based investment fund.  
On the HR front, both firms have sought out 
the best possible members for their management 
teams, from the UK, Europe or even the USA. 
Their ability to fill CEO and CFO slots with 
individuals who brought with them deep industry 
experience depended on introductions from globally 
active VCs and the management team’s own 
personal networks. Their ability to recruit talented 
engineers may also reflect the global networks of 
Cambridge University and the academic societies 
to which their founders belong.  
Thus, we can confirm that, at least in these two 
cases, these unique technology startups adopted 
from the very beginning a highly globalized 
approach to procuring the resources they needed, 
including core technologies, capital, and talent.  
 
Proposition 3: Startups offering customer convenience 
target initially target local markets, develop 
their competitive advantage, and then expand 
into global markets. 
 
During the startup phase, Abcam’s suppliers 
and customers were confined to the UK, primarily 
the region around Cambridge. As the business grew, 
it expanded its market to Europe, the USA, and 
Asia. Global expansion was possible because 
customers could place orders on the Web and 
because the small size of shipments minimized 
shipping costs. It has also opened branches in the 
USA, Japan, and Hong Kong to improve the 
efficiency of both product procurement and 
distribution.  
Since Bango’s business is IT services provided 
via the Internet, global expansion incurred no 
additional shipping or delivery costs. The CEO’s 
business experience had been in the USA, but the 
firm’s first target was Europe. Only later did it 
enter the larger US market. At that point, 
recruiting American vice-presidents spurred 
success in the global market. Here we glimpse the 
necessity for globalization even in customer 
convenience-oriented businesses.  
Thus we can confirm that in both these cases, 
the initial target market was local. Global 
expansion came later.  
 
Proposition 4: These startups are not highly 
globalized in acquisition of core technology, 
financial and human resources. 
 
With respect to core technologies, Abcam 
began by selling antibodies developed by the 
founder, a Cambridge University postdoc and the 
researchers with whom he worked, then gradually 
expanded the range of products it handled. It was a 
startup dependent on strong local ties. Bango’s 
core technology consisted of the skills built up by 
its founders through the experience of founding two 
earlier locally based startups.  
On the capital procurement front, both firms 
secured capital only from domestic sources. Bango 
was started with funds from the buy out of the two 
founders’ previous startup, supplemented by an 
investment by a local VC. As one of the founders 
explained, they tried to procure capital globally but 
found it difficult (even from the USA, where they 
had hoped to attract investors). Abcam was started 
with capital procured from its founder chairman, 
who was also an angel investor. The firm received 
no funding from VCs. Since buying and selling 
antibodies required only a small amount of 
additional research expense to achieve solid 
earnings, the company did not need to seek large 
amounts of external funding.  
On the HR front, these two firms differ 
somewhat. The members of Abcam’s management 
team almost all hold either doctorates or master’s 
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degrees in biochemistry or pathology from 
Cambridge University. They have been recruited 
via alumni associations or local networks. In this 
case, recruitment is very local. In contrast, 
Bango’s CEO was able to use his personal 
connections built while living in the USA to recruit 
two Americans as vice-presidents for sales and 
administration. That would have been very difficult 
to do without the CEO’s overseas experience and 
personal networks, because it had not received 
investments from overseas VCs, who would have 
been able to tap their global networks for 
introductions to capable individuals.  
Thus, in both these cases, the degree of 
globalization in procurement of core technologies 
and capital was low, if not completely local. On the 
HR front, globalization of recruitment would also 
have been low had there not been special 
circumstances in one of the two cases.  
5. Limitation and Further Research 
This essay proposes a tentative classification of 
high-tech startup globalization strategies and 
considers several propositions relating to resource 
procurement and targeted markets. Confining the 
case studies to firms based near Cambridge in the 
UK controls for differences due to geographical, 
social, economic, or political conditions; but with 
only only four cases, this research is only a 
preliminary effort. As a next step, it will necessary 
to examine more startups from the Cambridge 
region that fit the proposed classification, to see 
how the propositions hold up. Also, in the 
preliminary study reported here, two of the four 
firms were academic startups in the life sciences 
domain, so that direct comparisons were possible. 
It is now necessary not only to expand the sample 
but to ensure the presence of multiple cases in the 
same business domains.  
Future research will further expand the sample 
to include cases from Europe, the USA, and Japan. 
Analysis of an expanded, multinational sample will 
be particularly important when comparing startups 
that pursue technological innovation, to examine 
whether they target the global market from the 
start (Proposition 1) and procure resources globally 
(Proposition 2).  
Notes 
 1) Definitions of high-tech startups are taken from 
David J. Ben Daniel, the Don and Margi Berens Professor 
of Entrepreneurship at Cornell University, and the US 
Department of Commerce. According to the Department 
of Commerce, high-tech firms are those which spend 
twice as much as other firms on R&D (Shanklin, W.L. 
& Ryans, J.K.Jr, 1984). John Nesheim quotes Ben 
Daniel’s description of Apple during its startup phase, 
where he describes Apple as a small firm that had 
latent within it the power to create an economic 
foundation for future growth, generate employment, 
propagate technological change, and create a 
distinctive corporate culture that would influence 
management everywhere (Nesheim, 1997).  
 2) For more information on the four case studies, see 
Taji and Tsuyuki (2010) and Tsuyuki (2009). Information 
used here was taken from the four firms’ websites. 
The founders of Abcam and Bango were interviewed in 
September, 2010.  
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